6/30/11

Talmud Bavli Hullin 4a-b translation of Tzvee Zahavy

K.            Said the master, The unleavened bread of a Samaritan is permitted [for consumption on Passover] and a person may fulfill his obligation [to eat unleavened bread with it] on Passover. But this is obvious. [No it is not.] For you might have argued that they are not expert in the rules for guarding [the wheat from becoming fermented]. It comes to teach us [that they are trusted].

L.            R. Eliezer prohibits [eating it] because they are not as expert in the details of unleavened bread as Israelites. He reasons that they are not expert in the rules for guarding [the wheat from becoming fermented].

M.           Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel says, “Any religious duty that the Samaritans took hold of [to preserve] they are more punctilious [to observe it] than the Israelites.” Is this not identical to the rule of the first Tanna [in the text]? The dispute between them is the case of a rule that is specified in the Torah but that [the Samaritans] did not take hold of [to observe]. The first Tanna reasons that since it is written [in the Torah they observe it] even though they did not take hold of [the commandment in their practices]. And Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel reasons that if they took hold of it then we say yes [they are presumed to observe the rule]. And if they did not take hold of it then we say no [they are not presumed to observe the rule].

N.           If so [why does the text specify], Any religious duty that the Samaritans took hold of [to preserve]? It should say, “If they took hold of it.”

O.            But the dispute between them is in a case [where the rule is] not written [in the Torah] and they took hold of it [to observe it in their practice]. The first Tanna reasons because it is not written [in the Torah we cannot presume they hold to the rule] even though they took hold of it [to observe it in their practice]. And Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel reasons that since they took hold of it [to observe it] they are presumed [to observe it].

I.5
A.            Reverting to the body of the prior text: Raba said, “[If] an Israelite apostate who eats carrion to satisfy his craving [slaughters an animal] one may examine a knife and give it to him [to use for slaughtering]. And you are permitted to eat from [animals] he has slaughtered [I.3 O].” What is the basis for this opinion? Because he has permitted and forbidden [meat to choose from] he will not relinquish the permitted to eat the forbidden [meat]. If this is the case, even if they did not examine the knife [we should permit them to eat the meat from an animal he slaughtered]. [This is not a valid inference because although he would prefer to eat proper meat] he will not go out of his way [to find a proper knife].

B.            The rabbis would say to Raba, “There is a Tannaite teaching that supports your view. [Concerning] the leavened food belonging to transgressors — after Passover [4b] you may eat it immediately [and not scruple that it is leavened food that was kept by an Israelite on the Passover festival] because they exchange [their leavened food for that owned by a gentile on the festival. This demonstrates the presumption that people prefer to eat permitted foods] [T. Pisha 2:4].”

C.            You may reason that this follows the view of R. Judah who said, “Leavened foods [kept in the possession of an Israelite during the festival] after Passover [are forbidden] on the authority of the Torah.” And it was taught, Because they exchange. Thus [we demonstrate that] they will not relinquish the permitted to eat the forbidden [food].

D.            And why draw this conclusion? Perhaps this accords with the view of R. Simeon who said, “Leavened foods [kept in the possession of an Israelite during the festival] after Passover [are forbidden] on the authority of the rabbis.” And we are lenient with regard to rules based on the authority of the rabbis. We are not lenient with regard to rules based on the authority of the Torah. It is the case that [it accords with the view of] R. Simeon.

E.            But does it teach that I say [in fact], They exchanged the goods? It teaches, Because [as a rule] they exchange. They certainly do exchange [the goods]. And as in [the case of a rule derived from] the authority of the rabbis they do not relinquish the permitted to eat the forbidden [food]. In [the case of a rule derived from] the authority of the Torah, most certainly [they do not relinquish the permitted to eat the forbidden].

F.             Let us say this Tannaite teaching supports [Raba's] view. All are valid to [carry out an act of] slaughter [M. ul. 1:1 A], even a Samaritan, even an uncircumcised man, and even an Israelite apostate [T. 1:1 A-B]. What is the situation of this reference to an uncircumcised man? Is it that his brothers died as a result of their circumcisions [and thus he was not circumcised because of the danger]? This person is a complete Israelite. Rather it is simply a case of one who was an apostate with regard to the [commandment regarding the removal of the] foreskins. And he is of the opinion that one who is an apostate with regard to one commandment is not accorded status as an apostate with regard to the entire Torah.

G.            Consider the end of the text: and even an Israelite apostate. Now what is the situation with regard to this apostate? If he is an apostate with regard to another matter [other than slaughtering], this is identical to the case of an apostate with regard to the [commandment regarding the removal of the] foreskins. Rather, no. It must be that he is an apostate with regard to the same matter [i.e., laws of slaughtering]. And this accords with the view of Raba [that he may slaughter]. No [this is not the case].

H.           It is consistent to say that an apostate with regard to that matter [i.e., laws of slaughter] may not [slaughter]. What is the basis for this view? Since he already encroached upon [the prohibitions], he treats them [as if they were] to him permissible [actions].

I.              Rather [interpret that the text refers to] an apostate with regard to idolatry. And this accords with the view of R. Anan. For said R. Anan, said Samuel, “An Israelite who is an apostate with regard to idolatry — one may eat from [animals] that he slaughtered.”

I.6
A.            Reverting to the body of the prior text: Said R. Anan, said Samuel, “An Israelite who is an apostate with regard to idolatry — one may eat from [animals] that he slaughtered.” For so we found with respect to Jehoshaphat the King of Judah that he derived benefit [i.e., ate] from Ahab's dinner. As it is written, “And Ahab killed an abundance of sheep and oxen for him and for the people who were with him, and induced him to go up against Ramoth-gilead” (2 Chron. 18:2). And perhaps he killed the animals, but [Jehoshaphat] did not eat. It is written, “And induced him.” Perhaps he induced him with words. There is no inducement through words [implied in Scripture].

B.            None? But lo it is written, “If your brother...entices you” (Deut. 13:6). [There it means he entices him] with food and drink. But lo it is written, “Although you moved me [i.e., induced me] against him to destroy him without cause” (Job 2:3). [True, there Satan induced God with words but] in heaven things are different. But maybe [Jehoshaphat] drank but did not eat. What is the difference? Regarding drinking [wine of idolatry], we say an apostate with regard to idolatry does not have the status of an apostate with regard to the entire Torah. Regarding eating [meat from animals slaughtered improperly for idolatry] we say an apostate with regard to idolatry does not have the status of an apostate with regard to the entire Torah. Is it the same thing! [Regarding] drinking — the wine is ordinary wine [belonging to idolaters]. And ordinary wine of idolaters was not yet prohibited [at that time]. But regarding eating — it makes sense to say that an apostate with regard to idolatry is considered to be an apostate with regard to the entire Torah.

C.            Another possibility: It is not the practice of a king to drink without eating. Another possibility: It is written, “He killed... and he induced him.” With what did he induce him? With what he killed [i.e., the meat]. But perhaps Obadiah killed the animals [and they were not slaughtered for idolatrous purposes]. It is written, “An abundance.” Obadiah could not have handled it [i.e., so many animals, all by himself. Idolaters must have assisted him.]

D.            But perhaps the seven thousand [men who did not turn to idolatry] slaughtered. As it is written, “Yet I will leave seven thousand in Israel, all the knees that have not bowed to Baal” (I Kings 19:18). [This was not possible because] they were hiding from Jezebel. But perhaps Ahab's men were upright. No you cannot have concluded that, because it is written, “If a ruler listens to falsehood, all his officials will be wicked” (Prov. 29:12).

E.            But perhaps Jehoshaphat's men also were not upright. [Then we could say that] what was slaughtered by Ahab's men was eaten by Jehoshaphat's men and what was slaughtered by Obadiah was eaten by Jehoshaphat. No you cannot have concluded that based on [the verse cited], “If a ruler listens to falsehood, all his officials will be wicked” (Prov. 29:12) and lo, [if a ruler, such as Jehoshaphat, listens] to truth, his officials will be righteous.

F.             But perhaps that which Ahab's men slaughtered, Ahab and his men ate. And that which Jehoshaphat's men slaughtered, Jehoshaphat and his men ate. [5a] He would not have separated himself [from them]. What is the source of that assertion? If you say from that which is written, “I am as you are, my people as your people...” (I Kings 22:4), but of this part [at the conclusion of the verse,] “My horses as your horses,” shall we say the same [about that phrase]? Rather [it implies] what will be upon your horses will be upon mine. Here too [the implication is] whatever will be upon you and your nation will be upon me and my nation.

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